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When Two Wrongs 
Make A Right 
Leo Groarke 
York University 
One of the argument forms discussed in contemporary 
textbooks on informal logic is that which constitutes the 
fallacy "Two Wrongs". The alleged fallacy occurs when an 
argument encompasses the notion that some wrong act 
legitimates another act which would otherwise be immoral 
As Howard Kahane puts it in Logic and Contemporary 
Rhetoric: 
Just as it is almost second nature for politicians to attack 
their opponents by means of ad hominem argument, so 
also it is natural for them to defend themselves against the 
charges of others by using the fallacious idea that two 
wrong. make a right. The erroneous rationale behind this 
fallacy is that if the" other side" does it, or some other evil, 
then it's all right if we do it also.1 
I n a similar vein, Vincent Bary writes the "The fallacy of two 
wrongs is an argument that attempts to justify what is 
considered wrong by appealing to other instances of the 
same action.',2 Others adopt a similar point of view.3 
Despite their agreement, however, there are good reasons 
to think that the standard analysis of two wrongs reasoning 
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is mistaken, or at least incomplete. For though there are 
occasions when a two wrongs defence of an action is not 
acceptable (and is perhaps despicable), there are other 
occasions when such a defence is appropriate and does 
legitimate an act which would otherwise be immoral. It is 
in these cases that two wrongs dO"make a right", and it is 
important to distinguish them if we are to avoid dismissing 
arguments which can justify particular ways of acting. 
II. 
Before we turn to those cases where two wrongs rea· 
soning is legitimate, we may note the kind of situation 
where it is fallacious. Suppose, for example, that some 
government accuses another of subjecting dissenters to 
torture and other abuses that contravene the United 
Nations charter on human rights. I n response to such 
charges, one can imagine the government in question re-
plying that the nation which has leveled the charges 
employs similar-or worse-practices in its treatment of 
dissent Here we have a clear case of two wrongs rea-
soning which illustrates why such reasoning is sometimes 
illegitimate, for the government in question does not deny 
that it uses tortur~, and does not justify such practices, but 
simply directs attention to other cases. I n reply, it may be 
said that even if jts charges could be substantiated, this 
doesn't make aausive practices acceptable, and does not 
excuse the acts in question. At most, it shows that both 
governments are guilty of the wrongs such acts entail. 
To provide another example of fallacious two wrongs 
reasoning, we may turn to Kahane's discussion, where he 
notes that: 
Senator Robert Dole, then Republican National Com-
mittee Chairman, was guilty of two wrongs make a right 
when he defended President Nixon against charges of 
impropriety in the ITT case. (The charge was that ITT had 
received favours in an important anti-trust suit in return for 
their huge donation to Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign.) 
Dole's counterattack was to schedule a news conference 
to disclose" .. .improper activities involving the Democratic 
National Convention involving vast sums of money im-
properly received from big business". Dole hoped his 
attack would take some heat off Nixon, and it did until the 
Watergate scandal brought ITT back into the public eye.4 
In response to Dole's defense of Nixon, it can simply be 
said that it is irrelevant, for it does not show that Nixon was 
not gUilty of impropriety in receiving campaign donations, 
but at most shows that the democrats were guilty, too. Yet 
such considerations do not excuse or legitimate wrong-
doing on Nixon's part, and it follows that Dole's attemptto 
excuse Nixon is fallacious. 
Despite the merit of the standard analysis in such 
cases, there are problems with the notion of a two wrongs 
fallacy, for there are other instances where one wrong 
does legitimate an action which would otherwise be 
morally unacceptable. To see the problems that arise in 
this regard, we might first consider Johnson and Blair's 
claim that those arguments which appeal to the two 
wrongs line of reasoning are fallacious even if they amount 
to no more than attempts to mitigate blame or criticism. 
According to their analysis: 
Two Wrong. is a fallacy because, at least in the paradign 
versions, it is an attempt to do the impossible-to prove 
that a wrong act is not wrong. A wrong act, multiplied no 
matter how many times, cannot become right The vari-
ations on the basic fallacy don't go quite as far. They are 
attempts to excuse, or to mitigate blame, or to block cri-
l 
ticism. They don't try to justify the wrong, but their appeal 
to an earlier wrong remains an irrelevant line of defense. A 
wrong, repeated, becomes no more plausibl~ blame is no 
less in order, criticism is just as appropriate.!) 
To see why this claim is problematic, consider a situation 
where a bully acts in a malicious way toward a group of 
classmates. I magine that he taunts them and throws 
stones at them while they are playing in a schoolyard. Such 
acts are clearly wrong, and we can imagine him being 
scolded and punished afterwards. But now imagine the 
same acts proceeded by a long period where the group of 
classmates mercilessly provoke the boy in question. 
Suppose, for example, that they continually tease him 
because of his weight or colour, and throw stones at him 
when circumstances ensure that they will not be caught 
Given such a context, it does seem that the boy is not as 
much to blame as in the first instance. This is not to say that 
his rock throwing is acceptable (though in certain cir-
cumstances it might be), yet it does seem that the 
provocations he has suffered (the wrongs committed by 
his classmates) do mitigate our grounds for blame. In 
particular, there are less grounds than in a situation where 
no provocation occurs, and it follows that a previous wrong 
can make a"wrong" act right As Socrates points out in the 
Republic, it is not wrong to lie if someone intent on murder 
asks where his intended victim is. On the contrary, this is a 
case where the existence of a wrong (the decision to 
murder) does entail circumstances in which an act which 
would otherwise be wrong (a lie) is not immoral. I ndeed, it 
would in this case be morally wrong not to lie, and this 
shows how much the existence of a previous wrong can 
change our judgment of subsequent acts that mayor may 
not occur. 
Other cases where a wrong creates circumstances 
which legitimate otherwise unacceptable behaviour are 
easily come by. In cases of self-defense, for example, the 
injuring of an individual may be excusable because it is 
the only feasible response to similar actions on the part of 
an assailant And in cases where the punishment of an 
individual is justified, it is their violation of others' liberties 
which makes it permissable to deprive them of their own 
liberty, though the acts which punishment involves are 
not acceptable in other circumstances. I n all these cases, a 
moral argument can legitimately follow a two wrongs line 
of reasoning. 
To see how serious the problems are with the usual 
account of the two wrongs fallacy, it should be noted that 
there are many other cases where two wrongs reasoning 
can also justify an action. To take an important example, 
arguments in defense of civil disobedience always en-
compass the notion that some past or present wrong 
demands some protest which would otherwise be morally 
unacceptable (because it breaks the law). ~hus, ~andhi 
claimed that the British were wrong to stay In I ndla, and 
concluded that this justified civil disobedience on a 
massive scale. In a similar way, those in the American civil 
rights movement, the protests against the Vietnam war, 
and the more recent protests against nuclear arms, have 
sometimes engaged in civil disobedience, and always on 
the grounds that some other wrong warranted suc.h 
action. The following argument is, for example, the baSIC 
reasoning used by those anti-Vietnam organizations which 
arranged the illegal occupation of buildings and other 
government property: 
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Premise: The government has (wrongly) sent Americans 
to Vietnam. 
Conclusion: It is not wrong to send protestors to occupy 
government property. 
It would be a mistake to dismiss all arguments along these 
lines simply because they contain a two wrongs line of 
reasoning. Of course, such reasoning may be erroneous in 
a particular instance, but there are cases where civil 
disobedience is warranted, and in such cases one wrong 
does legitimate an action which is otherwise unacceptable. 
Another context in which two wrongs reasoning is 
sometimes appropriate is international politics. When a 
nation declares war on an aggressor, for example, it 
typically argues that the nation in question has acted in an 
immoral fashion, and that this legitimates retaliatory 
action. Pacifists might argue that such responses are 
always unacceptable, yet this is a contentious conclusion, 
and one would need a good deal of argument to back it It 
will not suffice to point out that declarations of war 
depend on two wrongs reasoning. Another political situ-
ation which can make for legitimate uses of two wrongs 
arguments arises when a particular nation argues that 
specific policies concerning immigration, employment, 
the environment, and the export of goods are legitimate 
because other nations adopt similar policies. I n Canada, 
the impOSition of tariffs, protectionist trade policies, and 
restrictions on foreign students have all been justified on 
these grounds. And though such actions are not always 
justified, it would be a mistake to dismiss all arguments 
along these lines. 
Given such examples, it follows that the version of the 
two wrongs fallacy known as "common practice" is 
problematic, for it allegedly invalidates any argument that 
contains" an attempt to justify some wrongdoing on the 
basis of some practice that has become commonly ac-
cepted.,,6 Given such a fallacy, one who does not believe 
in protectionist trade policies cannot consistently argue 
that they may be necessary if they are a common practice 
among other nations. Yet such an argument cannot be 
easily dismissed. 
In view of the couterexamples to the claim that two 
wrongs reasoning is fallacious, it should be clear that it is a 
mistake to suggest that two wrongs arguments must 
depend on an "erroneous rationale" (Kahane) or that it is 
"impossible" to construct a valid two wrongs argument 
(Johnson and Blair), or that such arguments introduce"a 
premise that is irrelevant to the conclusion either that we 
are innocent of wrongdoing or that our wrongdoing is 
justified" (Barry). On the contrary, there are occasions 
when a previous wrong makes a wrong act right. 
III. 
The problems with the standard account of two wrongs 
reasoning result from a failure to define the fallacy in a 
precise enough way. For though the usual definitions 
suggest that all instances of two wrongs reasoning are 
fallacious, it should be said that certain kinds of two 
wrongs arguments are invalid. It follows that the heart of 
any satisfactory account of the two wrongs fallacy must be 
a distinction between those cases where such reasoning is 
valid, and those cases where it is invalid. To see how such 
an account can be constructed, we may begin with 
Johnson and Blair's definition ofthe two wrongs fallacy, for 
it is more amenable to correction than the definitions 
already cited. According to their account, the two wrongs 
fallacy occurs when: 
1. M's action, X, has come under criticism. 
2. N (or M) tries to defend either X or M by citing Y,Z, or 
W-allegedly similar actions (the wrongness of which is 
granted or at least not challenged). 
3. Y, Z, or W have no relevance to the defence of X or of M 
for having done X. 7 
In defense of this definition, it might be said that it 
adequately covers the counterexamples I have suggested, 
for in all these cases clause 3 is violated (i.e. because Y, l, 
or Ware relevant to the defence of X). It might therefore 
be said that the misleading nature of the usual account 
might be rectified by adopting this definition along with 
the warning that there are (many) cases where clause 3 is 
violated. This is a move in the right direction. However, 
more needs to be said, for such an account is not very 
helpful unless it gives us some indication of the kinds of 
conditions which entail the violation of clause 3. It is by 
making these conditions explicit that we can construct a 
better definition of the two wrongs fallacy. 
To see the restrictions on clause 3 that are appropriate, 
we may note two features that characterize all the 
examples where two wrongs reasoning justifies some 
action. To begin with, all are cases where the act in 
question is an explicit response to the previous wrong 
which is in question-a response which tries to alleviate 
its unjust consequences. Hence when one lies to a would-
be murderer, one lies in the hope that one will prevent a 
murder, and when one commits violence in self-defense 
one attempts to prevent the unjust consequences of an 
unjustified attack. Similarly, when one commits civil 
disobedience one protests some law or action which is 
allegedly unjust, and when one punishes an individual 
one does so to prevent injustices that might otherwise 
occur (perhaps to provide compensation or to discourage 
such acts in the future). All the counterexamples we have 
considered are analogous in this respect. 
The second feature that characterizes the suggested 
counterexamples concerns possible alternatives to the 
act in question. Thus, an individual can legitimately 
embark on wrong acts in response to other acts only if 
there are no morally preferable acts which are equally 
appropriate. One can, in short, legitimately commit a 
wrong only to the extent which is required by the 
circumstances. In cases of self-defense, for example, one 
is entitled to meet force with force only to the extent 
which seems necessary to prevent the attack in question. 
To continue to use violence after the attack has effectively 
been stopped is morally repugnant, and illegal. I n a similar 
way, the justification of cases of civil disobedience must 
be based on the claim that there is no more acceptable 
way to protest the law or action which is called in 
question. If one is, for example, in a position to use legal 
means to quash some unjust law, then morality demands 
that they be used. It is only when such means are not 
available (or for some reason not feasible) that civil dis-
obedience is warranted. To take one other example, a 
nation which declares war is not justified if there is a 
morally more acceptable and equally effective way to 
resolve the dispute in question. The other counter-
examples can be analyzed in a similar way. 
Given the two constraints on valid two wrongs reasoning, 
we may incorporate them into our definition of the two 
wrongs fallacy, and can say that the fallacy occurs when: 
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1. M's action, X, has come under criticism. 
2. N (or M) tries to defend either X or M by citing Y, Z, or 
W-allegedly similar actions (the wrongness of which is 
granted or at least not challenged). 
3. N (or M) fails to show that X is a response to Y, Z, or W 
that attempts to eliminate or alleviate its unjust con-
sequences, or fails to show that there is no morally 
preferable response. 
In essence, this definition stipulates that the two wrongs 
fallacy occurs when the constraints on valid two wrongs 
reasoning are violated. Given such a definition, it is never-
theless clear that valid two wrongs arguments can be 
constructed in the cases we have considered, for these are 
cases where it can be shown that an action is an attem pt to 
alleviate the unjust consequences of other acts, and 
where there is no preferable alternative. 
To show that our definition of the two wrongs fallacy; 
does indict those situations where two wrongs reasoning 
is fallacious, we may return to earlier examples. To begin 
with, it is clear that a country which is accused of torturing 
dissenters cannot justify its actions by appealing to the 
wrongs of the accusing nation, for its acts can't be said to 
be a response that tries to alleviate their consequences. In 
a similar way, Dole's attempt to excuse Nixon from blame 
is not successful, for he does not show that Nixon's actions 
are an attempt to rectify the injustices caused by wrong-
doings on the part of the Democrats. 
To take a final example of fallacious two wrongs 
reasoning (this time from Johnson and Blair), we may con-
sider a case which arose in light of the Soviet Premier 
Alexei Kosygin's visit to Canada in 1974. The Soviet Union 
was at that time under attack for alleged discrimination 
against its minorities, and an account of his meeting with 
members of parliament reports that: 
When MPs asked Mr. Kosygin about problems with Jews 
and Ukrainians, he said such problems exist around the 
world. He mentioned blacks in the United States and the 
Irish in the United Kingdom.8 
The implication is that discrimination in the Soviet Union 
is morally excusable, given that it is common practice 
throughout the world. In reply, it may be said that this 
doesn't excuse such discrimination and Kosygin's appeal 
to common practice is not convincing, for there is (ob-
viously) no sense in which Soviet discrimination can be 
said to be required as a response to discrimination else-
where. 
Given that the outlined definition of the two wrongs 
fallacy does adequately deal with legitimate and illegi-
timate uses of two wrongs reasoning, one aspect of the 
definition deserves comment Thus, it should be noted 
that it leaves open the question what sorts of acts are 
morally preferable in a particular case, and that this 
question must ultimately be answered by turning to moral 
philosophy. Of course, we could build a more definite 
conception of morality into our definition. We could, for 
example, adopt a utilitarian perspective and declare that 
acts are to be ranked according to their abilityto maximize 
happiness, but such a move begs important philosophical 
questions. Qua logician, it seems better to leave such 
questions for elsewhere, and it is in most cases possible 
(at least for pedagogical purposes) to rely on intuitively 
clear examples. The vast majority of cases where fallacious 
two wrongs reasoning does occur (and certainly those 
cases considered in introductory texts on informal logic) 
can be handled without a detai led analysis of such central 
moral issues. 
IV. 
In summary, it may be said that the suggested account 
of the two wrongs fallacy is preferable to the standard 
account because it recognizes those cases where two 
wrongs reasoning is legitimate, and those cases where it is 
not In contrast, the usual account creates the mistaken 
impression that any two wrongs argument is unacceptable, 
and perpetuates the related misconception that acts are 
right or wrong independently of the circumstances that 
surround them. The proposed definition not only enables 
the student learning informal logic to recognize those 
instances of two wrongs reasoning which are fallacious, 
but also enables them to recognize valid two wrongs 
arguments. 
To see how our account allows a deeper analysis of two 
wrongs arguments, we might consider an example of two 
wrongs reasoning which Johnson and Blair discuss. Written 
in defense of a group of militant Indians who occupied a 
small park in Kenora, the argument in question suggests 
that: 
The occupation of a 14-acre park by the native people in 
the Kenora area is completely justified. After all, what's a 
mere 14 acres when they have been robbed of 14 million 
square miles-the entire North and South American con-
tinent9 
According to the standard analysis, this argument is invalid 
because it contains an instance of two wrongs reasoning. 
In short, because it argues that: 
The Indians were wronged long ago. 
The Indians were justified in occupying the 14-acre park in 
Kenora 
We have already seen that such an analysis is problematic 
because it is not true that all cases of two wrongs 
reasoning is invalid. In contrast, the revised account does 
not make this mistake, and tells us exactly why the 
argument represents a case of invalid two wrongs reasoning 
(for our purposes, we may ignore the problems that arise 
in light of its problematic premise). As this is a case of civil 
disobedience, the first restriction on valid two wrongs 
reasoning is fulfilled (Le. the Indians in question are at-
tempting to alleviate some perceived injustice). Yet th~ 
argument is still guilty of the two wrongs fallacy because It 
fails to show that there are no more appropriate means by 
which the I ndians could effectively achieve their end. Of 
course, it may be that the argument could be rectified, but 
this would require additional details which are not pro-
vided in the original argument 
Given this analysis of the argument in question, it can 
be said that it provides a more sensitive account of the 
argument, and of two wrongs reasoning, than the usual 
analyses. Given the frequency of such arguments in every-
day moral reasoning, the proposed account can provide a 
worthwhile addition to an account of informal logic and 
the fallacies which it contains. 
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Musclebuilding for Strength 
in Critical Thinking 
~ark VVeinstein 
Hunter College, CUNY 
In a recent paper1 Richard Paul argues for teaching 
critical thinking in the "strong sense". The paper offers his 
analysis of critical thinking in the"strong sense", but most 
importantly, attempts to motivate critical thinking teachers 
to give their students a sense of the "global problems in 
the analysis and evaluation of reasoning" (p.3). Paul 
argues that we must help students toward a "clearer 
recognition of the relationship between world views, 
forms of life (and) human engagements and interests": 
placing at the focus of our concern" dialectical/dialogical" 
"argument exchanges" in which "fundamental lines of 
reasoning are rarely "refuted" by individual charges of 
fallacy" (p.3). He requires that such a stance be taken 
"from the outset" in our critical thinking courses and 
suggests that we use "multicategorial ethical issues" 
(pp.2,S) as the means of obtaining strength. 
Paul rejects what he appears to consider the usual 
procedure in critical thinking courses: the teaching of ".a 
battery of atomic technical skills independent of egocentric 
beliefs and committments" (p. 3). Such an attitude 
towards the teaching of critical thinking, Paul maintains, 
merely reinforces student tendefl€ies t-o respond to 
challenging ideas with "sophistry" and "dismissal"; that is, 
to illicitly defeat or disregard alternatives threaten ing to 
"a priori egocentric (or sociocentric) belief systems" (p.2). 
Since I concur with much of what Paul says, and, 
moreover, believe that the II Spilit" of his Ploposal is more 
